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La question de savoir si les droits de propriété privée peuvent être des droits de la 
personne n’est pas nouvelle. Dans cet article, j’explique la plus récente tentative 
de Hanoch Dagan et Avihay Dorfman de reconnaître les droits de propriété privée 
comme étant des droits de la personne. Leur analyse de la propriété privée 
s’inscrit dans un plus grand projet visant à réinterpréter le droit privé et à mettre 
l’égalité réelle au centre de celui-ci. Mon article critique le fait qu’ils se 
concentrent sur les aspects horizontaux de la propriété et ignorent les différentes 
façons dont la propriété crée un sentiment d’appartenance à la communauté. 
J’avance aussi que l’approche de Dagan et Dorfman ne règle pas les problèmes 
qu’elle prétend résoudre, telle que la question des personnes dépossédées à cause 
de la ruée mondiale vers les terres. 
The question of whether private property rights can be human rights is longstanding. 
In this article, I unpack Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman’s recent attempt to 
render private property rights as capable of being human rights. Their account of 
private property forms part of a larger project to re-read private law and argues that 
the idea of substantive equality is at the heart of private law properly understood. In 
this article, I critique their focus on the horizontal aspects of property as ignoring the 
ways in which property always invokes a sense of community. I also argue that 
Dagan and Dorfman’s account does not solve the problems it claims to do, such as 
addressing those dispossessed by the global land rush. 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS can properly be considered to 
be human rights is longstanding.
1
 Arguably part of the controversy stems from the power
which private property grants and the fact of its unequal distribution.
2
 These two problems
are then compounded by the ways in which property speaks to both an individual’s vertical 
relationship with the state and an individual’s horizontal relationship with other individuals. 
While it is hardly controversial to say that property requires the acquiescence of others and is 
at least made more effective by the presence of the state, those without property offer a 
seemingly irresolvable challenge to the claimed benefits of property.  
There are a number of responses to these problems. One response is to ignore the 
distributional aspects of property and focus on what property is, leaving the inequality aspect 

 Lecturer, The City Law School, City, University of London.  Research for this article was conducted while I 
was the Catalyst Fellow at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank Alex Flynn, Don 
Leffers, Janet Mosher, and two anonymous peer reviewers for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper.  
1
 See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) [Waldron, Right to 
Private Property]; Henry J Abraham, “‘Human’ Rights vs ‘Property’ Rights: A Comment on the ‘Double 
Standard’” (1975) 90:2 Pol Sci Q 288; Tom Allen, “Liberalism, social democracy and the value of property 
under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2010) 59:4 Intl & Comp LQ 1055; Zehra F Kabasakal Arat, 
“Human Rights Ideology and Dimensions of Power: A Radical Approach to the State, Property and 
Discrimination” (2008) 30:4 HRQ 906; Rowan Cruft, “Are Property Rights Ever Basic Human Rights?” (2010) 
12 British J Pol & Intl Rel 142. This list is not exhaustive.  
2
 See e.g. Waldron, Right to Private Property, supra note 1 at 5; Nicholas Blomley, “Homelessness, Rights, and 
the Delusions of Property” (2009) 30:6 Urban Geography 577 at 581.   
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for another area of law.
3
 This approach focuses more on what is essential to property, what 
rights a person must have to have property, rather than how property affects individuals. A 
second response is to examine property’s role and to argue that private property is justified 
because of the way it supports autonomous individuals and prevents dependence.
4
 Yet rather 
than calling for redistribution, those in the second group argue that private property is only 
fully justified in a state with a robust welfare system.
5
 Again, the inequality aspect of 
property is pushed to one side. A third response comes from a group of self-professed 
progressive theorists who call for property to be reformed to fit democratic and other ideals.
6
 
 In a recent article, Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman have offered what might be 
considered a fourth approach to these problems, centred squarely on whether or not private 
property can be considered a human right.
7
 This article is part of a series of articles and 
working papers setting out a novel argument about what is unique about private law as 
private law.
8
 Their approach, which I set out more fully later, is both a mix of, and a 
challenge, to the second and third approaches. Their objection to the second approach, which 
they call the “libertarian account,” centres on how it “understands private law as a realm of 
prepolitical or apolitical interactions;”
9
 while they criticize the third approach, commonly 
associated with critical scholars, because of its tendency to see private law as just another 
area of public law.
10
 What is distinctive about private law, on Dagan and Dorfman’s account, 
is that it is “the law of our horizontal interactions” (as opposed to our vertical interactions 
with the state) and that it is about vindicating our claim “to relational justice from one 
another.”
11
 As they put it, their approach is one committed to “individual self-determination 
(and not merely independence) and substantive equality.”
12
 Yet they also argue that, when 
properly understood, private law is already committed to ideals of substantive rather than 
simply formal equality.
13
 At the risk of oversimplifying, their overarching point is that a 
natural person is owed a certain degree of respect in their interpersonal dealings and a private 
law which does not recognize that, is not private law as understood by Dagan and Dorfman. 
Flowing from this, their account of private property, which I call “property-as-respect,” 
understands property as implying “respect from both public authority and other individuals” 
                                                 
3
 This is the approach adopted by James Penner; see JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997) at 5-6 [Penner, Idea of Property]; James Penner, “The State Duty to Support the Poor in 
Kant’s Doctrine of Right” (2010) 12 British J Pol & IR 88 at 104-05 [Penner, “State Duty”]. 
4
 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA; Harvard 
University Press, 2009) at 31-34, 63, 52, 91 [Ripstein, Force and Freedom]; Ernest J Weinrib, Corrective 
Justice (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2012) at 263-96 [Weinrib, Corrective Justice]. 
5
 See e.g. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 4 at 263-96; Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom, supra note 
4 at 279-286. 
6
 See Gregory S Alexander, Eduardo M Penalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S Underkuffler, “A Statement 
of Progressive Property,” (2008-2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 743 [Alexander et al]. For an example see, Joseph 
William Singer, “Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society” (2008-2009) 94 Cornell 
L Rev 1009 [Singer, “Democratic Estates”]. 
7
 Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, “The Human Right to Private Property” (2017) 18:2 Theor Inq L 391 
(forthcoming), online: <ssrn.com/abstract=2624428> [perma.cc/D27C-UH83][Dagan & Dorfman, “Human 
Right”].  
8
 Hanoch Dagan & Aviahy Dorfman, “Just Relationships” (2016) 116:6 Colum L Rev 1395 at 1414 [Dagan & 
Dorfman, “Just Relationships”]; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, “Justice in Private” (9 July 2014), online: 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2463537> [perma.cc/B9N9-72KS][Dagan & Dorfman, “Justice in Private”]; Hanoch Dagan 
& Avihay Dorfman, “Interpersonal Human Rights and Transnational Private Law” (27 Oct 2016), online: 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2860275> [perma.cc/Q7SV-UT4T] [Dagan & Dorfman, “Interpersonal Human Rights”]. 
9
 Dagan & Dorfman “Just Relationships,” supra note 8 at 1397 
10
 Ibid at 1398. 
11
 Ibid at 1398 
12
 Ibid at 1414. 
13
 Ibid at 1399. 
8
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for “natural persons’ status as free and equal.”
14
 Consequently, their account matters not just 
at a national or state level, but at an international and transnational level, given how it is 
rooted in our relationships with each other as humans not just as citizens.
15
   
In “The Human Right to Private Property,” Dagan and Dorfman’s goals are threefold: 
first, to offer an account of private property which can fit with human rights’ ideals; second, 
to challenge what they refer to as the “libertarian account” of property; and, third, to offer an 
understanding of private property which could temper the current global land rush.
16
 While I 
have significant sympathy with Dagan and Dorfman’s account, my goal in this paper is to 
highlight some weaknesses with it. My central objection is to the idea that property law can 
be explained by the concept of interpersonal relations. The use of interpersonal relations to 
explain private law can also be seen among theorists Dagan and Dorfman describe as 
“libertarian.”
17
 As such, while my focus might be on Dagan and Dorfman’s argument, my 
criticisms have a broader purchase. 
 I argue that property law cannot be explained as a series of individual-individual 
relationships, as seems to be implied under the interpersonal account. As some critics of the 
libertarian approach have pointed out, given how property creates rights good against the 
world and no-one can have interpersonal relationships with everyone else, private property 
requires a state to create in rem rights.
18
 Dagan and Dorfman’s account is equally vulnerable 
to this critique and, as I show later, their attempted response is inadequate. My point is that 
property necessarily invokes a particular community.   
Related to the ways in which property necessarily invokes a particular community is 
the role of things in Dagan and Dorfman’s account. Though their account is interpersonal, 
that is, it focuses on the individual-individual relationships of property, and thus does not rely 
on the claim that property is the law-of-things, things still matter. Under property-as-respect 
an individual’s autonomy is respected by others when they avoid trespass or using an 
individual’s property without their permission. Thus the thing functions, as the proxy for the 
owner which raises two questions.
19
 First, how are we to know what things are property 
without some grasp of the broader practice or community in which the thing is located? 
Secondly, does the law really respect persons or things and, if the latter, does property law 
respect a person who owns nothing? I call this second issue the “proxy problem.”   
Dagan and Dorfman might aim at substantive equality yet the property-as-respect 
argument does not fully account for the owner’s authority over others. Simply making 
everyone an owner, as they suggest,
20
 will not address the power imbalances inherent in 
owner/non-owner interactions. Property-as-respect may well offer a convincing explanation 
for the idiosyncrasies of trespass law but it does not account for other doctrines, such as 
adverse possession, nor does it fully address the inequality of the owner/non-owner 
relationship.
21
   
                                                 
14
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Human Right,” supra note 7 at 393. 
15
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Interpersonal Human Rights,” supra note 8 at 4. 
16
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Human Right,” supra note 7 at 411-415. 
17
 These theorists are Ripstein, Force and Freedom, supra note 4 at 34; Allan Beever, Forgotten Justice: Forms 
of Justice in the History of Legal and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 1-6 [Beever]; 
Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 17. 
18
 Dan Priel, “Private Law: Commutative or Distributive?” Osgoode Hall Law School, Research Paper No 
56/2013 at 14 [Priel, “Communicative or Distributive”]. 
19
 Dorfman is explicit about the thing’s role as a proxy in Avihay Dorfman, “Private Ownership and the 
Standing to Say So” (2014) 64:3 UTLJ 402 at 421 [Dorfman, “Standing to Say So”]. 
20
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Human Right,” supra note 7 at 394-5, 410-11.  
21
 Due to constraints of space I leave the question of how property-as-respect does not account for adverse 
possession to one side. 
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What Dagan and Dorfman, along with other theorists, have failed to realize is that 
property law necessarily creates vertical relationships by virtue of the horizontal relationships 
supposedly at its heart. To give an example, consider the structure of a corporation. 
Corporations are not simply a series of horizontal relationships but, internal to themselves, 
contain a variety of vertical relationships. Admittedly, Dagan and Dorfman leave corporate 
and commercial law and the question of how to treat legal persons outside of their account,
22
 
though they do imply that their insights will be applicable to corporations.
23
 Nonetheless, the 
complexity of corporations suggests that, in practice, horizontal and vertical relationships are 
more intertwined than Dagan and Dorfman have yet accounted for. Or at least, that we might 
need some way of capturing the hierarchical nature of some horizontal relationships.    
I begin by setting out and contextualizing Dagan and Dorfman’s account of the 
private property as a human right. In order to do this, I first examine other property theories 
and then Dagan and Dorfman’s work prior to their new theory of private law. Then I move on 
to set out their account of private property as detailed in “The Human Right to Private 
Property.” Where relevant, I make reference to the other papers and articles in this series. Part 
two examines the shortcomings of their argument with respect to private property. In addition 
to raising doubts over whether their argument could solve the injustice of the global land 
rush, i part two focuses on the role of things, the question of how in rem rights are created 
and the ongoing need to account for the owner’s authority, the proxy problem, and the 
intertwined nature of horizontal and vertical relationships. To some extent these difficulties 
overlap and point to the importance of shared understandings in property law and the role of 
others in creating and maintaining property rights. Private law, particularly property law, is 
inherently social but the definition of “social” is more than simply a series of individual 
relationships; it is a complex web which speaks to a certain sense of community, which can 
be inclusive or exclusive.   
 
I. THE BATTLE OVER PROPERTY THEORY 
 
Both Dagan and Dorfman are established property theorists in their own right. Each has 
written several articles individually and with other scholars, setting out their approaches to 
property and other areas of private law. As their work on private property as a human right 
builds on their previous work and is, in my view, an attempt to marry the major strands of 
each other’s work, this section examines their previous work and then their current, joint 
work. However, in order to fully understand Dagan and Dorfman’s project it is helpful to 
have a sense of the broader shape of property theory, as both have written and are writing 
against particular group(s) of scholars. As such, I begin with the broader background of 
property theory before moving on to examine each of their approaches to property then I set 
out their argument and goals in “The Human Right to Private Property.”   
 
A. THE STATE OF PROPERTY THEORY 
 
The modern flourishing of property theory began as a backlash against the bundle of rights 
picture of property. Writing in the mid-1990s, James Penner described the bundle of rights as 
the dominant paradigm of property,
24
 but, while the bundle idea clearly has some life left in 
                                                 
22
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Human Right,” supra note 7 at 393 n7. 
23
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Interpersonal Human Rights,” supra note 8 at 5 n10; Dagan & Dorfman, “Just 
Relationships,” supra note 8 at 1399 n7. 
24
 JE Penner, “The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property,” (1995-1996) 43 UCLA L Rev 711 at 712 [Penner, 
“Bundle of Rights”]. 
10
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 it is doubtful that Penner’s statement is as true as it once was. In property theory, at least, 
the bundle of rights idea has fallen out of favour with no dominant vision to replace it. 
Instead, there are a number of currents and cross-currents amongst different property theorists 
with a noticeable divide between those theorists who seek to focus on what rights are 
essential for an individual to have private property or to be an owner, and those theorists who 
seek to emphasize the role that property plays in society and social welfare. As such, I refer 
to the former group as ‘rights-based theorists’ and the latter as progressive theorists.
26
 While 
there are overlaps between these two groups in how they understand the role of property, as 
well as scholars who do not readily fit into either, these two groupings are meant to be fairly 
broad and are not representative of specific “schools” of thought but more of broader themes 
and approaches.
27
 There are also, particularly among the rights-based theorists, sub-divisions 
within these groups. In this sub-section I offer a brief outline of the main ideas in each group 
in order to better situate Dagan and Dorfman’s argument. Before beginning, however, it is 
important to point out that one key area of agreement across property theory is that property 
is inherently social. What is more divisive is what is meant by ‘social’ or the implications that 
term might have for property.   
The primary focus of the rights-based theorists is on what right(s) a person must have 
to have private property and why they have these rights. The why aspect of the question is 
often less well-developed than a discussion of the rights which constitute property. Two 
notable exceptions are Penner and Smith, who root their understandings of property in our 
interest in using things and from this interest, deduce a number of key rights.
28
 While Penner 
offers the rights of exclusion, use, and alienation as being key to his definition of property,
29
 
Smith sees similar features as being integral but not absolute to property.
30
 As such, even 
though they disagree on some of the details, Penner and Smith agree that property law 
protects our interest in using things and that this idea is central to understanding what is and 
is not property and can help explain how property doctrines work. Penner, for example, 
argues at length that the right to sell is not a property right because it is not encompassed in 
the use interest. In so doing, Penner distinguishes property from contract.
31
 As with Smith, 
Penner’s understanding of the right to exclude is not absolute; for Penner the point is to 
exclude some rather than all.
32
 The idea of sharing with some but not all flows from the use 
interest as many things can only be usefully used by a handful of people. Such an observation 
illustrates Penner’s close attention to the nature of things and how that reflects the property 
rights we might be able to have in them. 
Other rights-based theorists are less explicit about the interest which property protects 
and focus more on the rights of property, specifically which right or rights constitute 
ownership. Echoing Penner, Epstein offers three core rights which are essential to ownership: 
                                                 
25
 Stephen R Munzer, “A Bundle Theorist Holds On to His Collection of Sticks” (2011) 8 Econ Journal Watch 
265; Jane B Baron, “Rescuing the Bundle of Rights Metaphor in Property Law” (2014) 82:2 U Cin L Rev 57. 
26
 The term rights-based theorists is taken from David Lametti, “Property and (Perhaps) Justice” (1997-98) 43 
McGill LJ 663. See also, Dan Priel, “Torts, Rights, and Right-Wing Ideology” (2011) Torts LJ 1. The term 
progressives is taken from Alexander et al, supra note 6. 
27
 Nicholas Blomley, “Performing Property: Making the World” (2013) 36 Can JL & Juris 23 at 47 (noting how 
critics help constitute the schools and approaches they seek to challenge). 
28
 Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 3 at 49; Henry E Smith, “Property as the Law of Things” (2011-2012) 
125 Harvard L Rev 1691 at 1691-93 [Smith, “Law of Things”]. 
29
 Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 3 at 152.  
30
 Smith, “Law of Things,” supra note 28 at 1699; Yun-chien Chang & Henry E Smith, “An Economic Analysis 
of Civil versus Common Law Property” (2012) 88:1 Notre Dame L Rev 1 at 32-33. 
31
 Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 3 at 38-64; Penner, “Bundle of Rights,” supra note 24 at 743, 750-54. 
32
 Penner, “Bundle of Rights,” supra note 24 at 743; Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 3 at 75. 
11
Hamill: Community, Property, and Human Rights: The Failure of Property-as
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2017 2




exclusion, use, and alienation.
33
 The role of things is more implicit than explicit in his 
argument as his main concern is with property as an individual entitlement.  
Meanwhile, other scholars insist that ownership consists of a single, key right. The 
most famous of the single-right arguments is Thomas Merrill’s right to exclude.
34
 According 
to Merrill all other property rights flow from the right to exclude.
35
 Merrill’s later work 
emphasizes the limited nature of this right given the role of others and the state, though he 
continues to argue that property could exist outside of the state.
36
 His focus, like Epstein’s, is 
on property as an individual entitlement and the way in which this is reflected through 
doctrine. As he put it, “[e]xclusion lies at the root of property because the institution of 
property is dependent on possession, and exclusion lies at the root of possession.”
37
 Here 
Merrill’s focus is on the owner’s power to exclude others from a specific thing, rather than on 
those being excluded. There are two points to take note of in Merrill’s focus on the right to 
exclude. First, he understands the “legal things” of property to be capable of being bounded 
and severable from all other things. Secondly, he sees exclusion as resulting from an act of 
the owner 
The idea of exclusion is not always focused on the owner’s role in the process. Simon 
Douglas and Ben McFarlane have argued that what is distinctive about property rights is 
everyone else’s duty of non-interference.
38
 Their analysis uses the Hohfeldian account of 
rights to explain property law. Hohfeld understood all rights as legal relations between 
individuals and distinguished between claim-rights and privileges or liberties. According to 
Hohfeld claim-rights exist when someone else has a duty to do or not do something, while 
liberties are about what an individual is allowed to do.
 39
 In terms of property law, the right to 
exclude consists of the duty of everyone else to keep out. This suggests that property is 
dependent on the acts of others, rather than just the acts of the owner. Such an understanding 
does not protect an owner’s right to use their land,
40
 instead the right to use is best understood 
as a liberty, in the Hohfeldian sense, which is indirectly protected by the property torts of 
trespass and nuisance.
41
 What Douglas and McFarlane’s work makes clear is the role of 
others in creating individual property rights, though they maintain the idea of physical 
exclusion. 
The idea of physical exclusion is not always central to the right to exclude as 
illustrated by Larissa Katz’s agenda-setting right. Katz explicitly disavows the “boundary 
approach” of other rights-based theorists because it cannot properly account for ownership.
42
 
Instead, she argues that what is distinctive about and exclusive to owners is the right to set the 
                                                 
33
 Richard Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration and the Rule of Law 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) at 77-79 [Epstein, Design for Liberty]. 
34
 Thomas W Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude” (1998) 77 Neb L Rev 730 [Merrill, “Right to 
Exclude”]. 
35
 Ibid at 740-41. 
36
 Thomas W Merrill, “The Property Strategy” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 2061 at 2076 [Merrill, “Property 
Strategy”]. 
37
 Thomas W Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude II” (2014) 3 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights 
Conference Journal 1 at 14. 
38
 S Douglas & B McFarlane, “Defining Property Rights” in James Penner & Henry Smith, eds, Philosophical 
Foundations of Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 219. 
39
 Ibid at 221-27. 
40
 Larissa Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law” (2008) 58 UTLJ 275 at 282 [Katz, “Exclusion”]. 
41
 Simon Douglas, “The Content of a Freehold: A ‘Right to Use’ Land?” in Nicholas Hopkins, ed, Modern 
Studies in Property Law Vol VII (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 359 [Douglas, “Content of a 
Freehold”]. Compare Christopher Essert, “Nuisance and the Normative Boundaries of Ownership” (2016) 52 
Tulsa L Rev 85 [Essert, “Nuisance”]. 
42
 Katz, “Exclusion,” supra note 40 at 277; See also, Christopher Essert, “Property in Licenses and the Law of 
Things” (2014) 59 McGill LJ 559 at 564-65. 
12
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agenda for the owned thing.
43
 Implicit in this understanding is the importance of use rights 
and the need to respect an individual’s decision-making power. However, Katz notes that an 
individual’s agenda-setting authority is only supreme vis-à-vis other individuals and is 
subordinate to that of the state.
44
 Additionally, the owner’s authority is limited to worthwhile 
ends and they may not use their property to manipulate others.
45
 Here, we can again see the 
balancing of property as an individual right with the fact that it will exist in a social context 
with other individuals and their rights. 
The argument that Katz and other rights-based theorists are invoking is arguably made 
explicit by the neo-Kantian rights-based theorists. Unlike Penner and Smith, who root their 
property theory in our interest in using things, the neo-Kantians begin with the idea of 
individual autonomy, typically expressed as “the moral idea that no person is in charge of 
another”
46
 and use this idea to construct a theory of property. To put it a different way, 
property is about solving the question of authority, rather than protecting uses.
47
 For neo-
Kantians, property is protected because of the way in which it allows individuals to “set[] and 
pursu[e] purposes” and is protected by “restrictions on the ways in which others may set and 
pursue purposes.”
48
 What is striking about the neo-Kantian approach to property is that, given 
their starting point, they have to find a way to explain the inequalities of private property.
49
 
Rather than argue for redistribution, neo-Kantians “put[] the state in charge of dealing with 
the moral problems generated by ownership.”
50
 In short they advocate for a welfare state.
51
 
Instead of locating the answer to property’s inequalities outside of property, the 
progressive theorists seek to address property’s inequalities in a manner internal to property.  
Alexander argues that property contains an inherent social obligation norm which can be used 
to promote human flourishing.
52
 Here Alexander invokes the Aristotelian idea of human 
flourishing and argues that it explains nuisance law, environmental protections, and other 
limits on property rights.
53
 His point is that these limits are not external to property but a 
reflection of its inherent social-obligation norm. Relatedly, Alexander’s property theory is 
less individualistic and focuses more on the social aspects of property. That being said, he too 




Alexander’s social obligation norm has significant overlap with Singer’s social 
relations model of property.
55
 Singer based the social relations model of property around the 
principles of nuisance law but had a more communitarian understanding of nuisance law than 
                                                 
43
 Katz, “Exclusion,” supra note 40 at 277-78. 
44
 Ibid at 295. 
45
 Larissa Katz, “Spite and Extortion: A Principle of Abuse of (Property) Right” (2012) Yale LJ 1444 at 1449-
52[Katz, “Spite and Extortion”]. 
46
 Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2016) at 6 [Ripstein, Private 
Wrongs]. 
47
 Arthur Ripstein, “Possession and Use” in Penner & Smith, eds, supra note 37, 156 at 181 [Ripstein, 
“Possession and Use”]. 
48
 Ripstein, Private Wrongs, supra note 46 at 52. 
49
 It is not that other theorists don’t recognize this, see Merrill, “Property Strategy,” supra note 36 at 2093. 
50
 Larissa Katz, “Ownership and Social Solidarity: A Kantian Alternative” (2011) 17:2 Legal Theory 119 at 128. 
51
 Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 4 at 265. For criticisms see Penner, “State Duty,” supra note 3. Dagan 
and Dorfman’s response is covered in the next section. 
52
 Gregory S Alexander, “The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2008-2009) 94 Cornell L 
Rev 745 at 748 [Alexander, “Social Obligation Norm”]. 
53
 Ibid at 780, 796. 
54
 Ibid at 782. 
55
 Joseph William Singer, “No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations to Private Property” (1995-1996) 90 
Nw UL Rev 1283 at 1461 [Singer, “No Right to Exclude”]. 
13
Hamill: Community, Property, and Human Rights: The Failure of Property-as
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2017 4




Essert’s recent examination of nuisance’s role in constituting ownership.
56
 Essert’s account 
emphasizes the “reciprocity” of nuisance and is of a piece with the relational theorists insofar 
as he understands ownership to result in no-one being in charge of the owner.
57
 In contrast, 
Singer considers the broader public role of nuisance law rather than seeing it as an issue 
between owners qua owners.
58
 
In later work, Singer shifts his approach to “focus[] on understanding the role that 
property and property law play in a free and democratic society that treats each person with 
equal concern and respect.”
59
 Such an understanding places the “shape and equality of human 
relationships at the core of … determining whether a set of property rights can be accepted as 
legitimate in a free and democratic society.”
60
 There is a clear overlap with the neo-Kantian 
concern for individual autonomy, the key difference being that Singer seems to call for 
reforms to property in a way which the neo-Kantians do not.   
Although there is much more that could be said about arguments and positions in 
property theory, this brief overview has sought to highlight the main strands. Despite the 
insistence of some rights-based theorists that property is the law of things, the role of others 
in property law remains important.  Yet whether others are limits on our own property rights, 
or essential to defining what our rights are, is less clear. Similarly, the role of the state 
oscillates between being a limiter and creator of property rights. With this in mind, I now 
move on to examine where Dagan and Dorfman’s work fits in the broader scheme of property 
theory.   
 
B. DAGAN AND DORFMAN’S UNDERSTANDING OF PROPERTY 
 
Both Dagan and Dorfman have written extensively about property prior to their joint work on 
property as a human right. As with the previous sub-section, I do not intend to offer an 
exhaustive overview of their work, instead my goal is to capture the general arguments and to 
explain how they have responded to the property theories set out above. For ease of analysis I 
will take both in turn. 
Dagan describes himself as both a Legal Realist and a liberal.
61
 He understands 
property as a plurality of institutions rather than being reducible to any one factor or 
regulatory principle.
62
 These institutions are not, however, unlimited in number. Instead, 
because they are “unifying normative ideals for core categories of interpersonal relationships 
… they must be limited in number and standardized.”
63
 Such limits allow property to be an 
                                                 
56
 Ibid at 1461-1477. See also Essert, “Nuisance,” supra note 41; Douglas, “Content of a Freehold,” supra note 
41. 
57
 Essert, “Nuisance,” supra note 41 at 99-102 (“the thought here is that, unless I am in charge of some location, 
then everywhere and always, I am in a location where others are in charge of me” at 102). Arguably Essert’s 
account leans more towards Dagan and Dorfman as he also suggests everyone might need property, ibid at 89; 
Christopher Essert, “Property and Homelessness” (2016) 44:4 Phil & Pub Aff 266 at 281. 
58
 Singer, “No Right to Exclude,” supra note 55 at 1464.   
59
 Singer, “Democratic Estates,” supra note 6 at 1047. 
60
 Ibid at 1050. 
61
 Hanoch Dagan, “The Craft of Property” (2003) 91 Cal L Rev 1517 at 1564 [Dagan, “Craft”]; Hanoch Dagan 
& Michael Heller, “The Liberal Commons” (2000-2001) 110 Yale LJ 549 [Dagan & Heller]. 
62
 Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 57 [Dagan, 
Property]; Lisa M Austin, “Pluralism, Context, and the Internal Life of Property: A Response to Hanoch Dagan” 
(2013) 63 UTLJ 22 at 26 [Austin]. 
63
 Dagan, “Craft,” supra note 61 at 1562. 
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effective framework for these relationships.
64
 Accordingly, “property institutions,” to borrow 
Dagan’s term, will differ depending on the resource and the social context.
65
   
Not surprisingly, Dagan has criticized the neo-Kantian strand of the rights-based 
theorists and the neo-Aristotelian strand of the progressive theorists for their reliance on a 
single explanatory factor as the basis for property law.
66
 For Dagan, the failure of each of 
these strands is the mirror image of the other: the neo-Kantians are too individualistic, while 
the neo-Aristotelians do not ensure “proper legal safeguards for their members’ 
independence.”
67
 The concern with individual independence, and a particular concern for an 
individual’s ability to exit any property relationship is, for Dagan, a key liberal value.
68
 
The Legal Realist aspect of Dagan’s approach is evidenced by his concern with 
relationships and his “legal optimism.”
69
 By “legal optimism,” Dagan means “an attempt to 
explain and develop the existing property forms in a way that accentuates their normative 
desirability while remaining attuned to their social context.”
70
 In other words, his account 
locates the certainty of property law in the relationships it can facilitate rather than in 
doctrine.
71
 As such, Dagan’s understanding of property is explicitly normative and views 
legal doctrine as indeterminate and malleable. Despite his recognition of relationships, 
“[c]ommunity is never an end in itself” for Dagan,
72
 and his main goal remains enhancing 
and supporting individual autonomy.
73
 Thus, even though he has long been concerned to 
capture a thicker understanding of the individual than the abstract equality of the neo-Kantian 
and libertarian approaches to property law, individuals are still more important than 
community for Dagan. 
In terms of where Dagan fits in the broader scheme of property theory, he is perhaps 
more of a progressive than a rights-based theorist. Certainly, his Legal Realist sympathies 
would not endear him to many of the rights-based theorists who continue to use Legal 
Realism as their chief foil.
74
 Dagan’s concern with human relationships overlaps with 
Smith’s argument that property is a framework for human interaction,
75
 but Dagan 
emphasizes relationships rather than mere interactions, suggesting a more intimate, or at least 
interconnected, understanding of society. What distinguishes Dagan from the progressive 
theorists with respect to the role of society is his stronger emphasis on individual autonomy. 
That being said, his optimistic reading of property doctrine suggests more in common with 
progressive theorists than rights-based theorists. 
In contrast, Dorfman’s work seems more closely aligned to that of the rights-based 
theorists. His work on property has tended to be both a critique and  re-reading of  rights-
based accounts of property law. For example, he argues that the rights-based theorists’ 
definition of private ownership, what he calls the “exclusive-use” thesis, “is not a theory of 
private ownership … it is a theory of possession that fails to account for elementary features 
                                                 
64
 Hanoch Dagan, “Property’s Structural Pluralism: On Autonomy, the Rule of Law, and the Role of 
Blackstonian Ownership” (2014) 3 Brigham-Kanner Propr Rts Conf J 27 at 34 [Dagan “Property’s Structural 
Pluralism”]. 
65
 Ibid at 33. 
66
 Dagan, Property, supra note 62 at 57. 
67
 Ibid at 66. 
68
 Dagan & Heller, supra note 61 at 567. 
69
 Dagan, “Craft,” supra note 61 at 1564. 
70
 Ibid at 1564. 
71
 Austin, supra note 62 at 25. 
72
 Alexander, “Social Obligation Norm,” supra note 52 at 759 
73
 Hanoch Dagan, “Inside Property” (2013) 63 UTLJ 1 at 21 [Dagan, “Inside Property”]. 
74
 Henry E Smith, “The Persistence of System in Property Law” (2015) 163 U Pa L Rev 2055 at 2055-2067 
[Smith, “Persistence”]; Andrew S Gold & Henry E Smith, “Sizing Up Private Law” (10 Aug 2016), online: 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2821354> at 9 [perma.cc/A43Q-U3TP]. 
75
 Smith, “Law of Things,” supra note 28 at 1707. 
15
Hamill: Community, Property, and Human Rights: The Failure of Property-as
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2017 6




of private ownership such as the idea that it takes the form of a private-law practice.”
76
 
Dorfman argues that what is distinctive about ownership is “the authority to fix in some 
measure the normative standing of others in relation to an object.”
77
 As such, he adopts the 
Hohfeldian position that legal norms “govern relationships between persons.”
78
  
Moreover, Dorfman insists that the right of alienation is essential if we are to 
understand ownership in a specifically private law manner. Alienation is how owners can fix 
or alter the standing of others to objects. The benefit of Dorfman’s account is that it leaves 
room for disagreement about the scope of ownership.
79
 As such, his account sidesteps the 
difficulty rights-based theorists have in accounting for the limitation of ownership rights. For 
example, under Dorfman’s thesis, the way planning law limits use rights is not necessarily a 
violation of ownership because the owner can still sell their property and so on.
80
 
In arguing that what is distinctive about ownership is the position of authority over 
others, Dorfman’s account necessarily raises questions about the legitimacy of that 
authority.
81
 As a partial answer to the question of an owner’s authority, Dorfman developed 
an account of property best described as property-as-respect. Under property-as-respect, the 
idea underlying key property doctrines is that one person should not substitute their judgment 
for another’s..
 82
 To put it differently, property law respects an   individual by respecting their 
decisions about their property.
83
 Dorfman argues that property-as-respect better explains the 
strictness of trespass—by which he means the ways in which trespass can result in damages 
even if no harm was done—because the trespasser has substituted his judgment for the 
owner’s.
84
 Here, Dorfman’s argument has some similarities with David Lametti’s assertion 
that property law should be understood as being about relationships mediated through a 
thing.
85
 Dorfman recognizes that property law can still make demands on other people but, 
because such demands are made by an individual and not in the name of the state, property 
law remains an area of private law.
86
 That being said, because of the recognition inherent in 
property law, it does have an inescapably political aspect.
87
 
Dorfman’s property-as-respect argument overlaps to some extent with the neo-
Kantian account of property. Both agree on “the relational structure of rights and duties” but 
where they differ is that neo-Kantians do not imbue the fact of ownership with any 
justificatory significance.
88
 That an object is the subject of property ought to be enough, in 
Dorfman’s view, to govern how a person approaches it; an assessment of whether using 
                                                 
76
 Avihay Dorfman, “Private Ownership” (2010) 16 Legal Theory 1 at 2 [Dorfman, “Private Ownership”]. His 
description of “exclusive-use” ignores that the theorists he claims to promote this understanding also emphasize 
some form of alienation. For example, he calls Penner an “exclusive-use” theorist but downplays Penner’s 
account of alienation, Dorfman, “Private Ownership,” ibid at 2n2, 8, 12-16, 33 but see Penner, Idea of Law, 
supra note 3 at 153-168. See also Penner “Bundle of Rights,” supra note 24 at 742. 
77
 Dorfman, “Private Ownership,” supra note 76 at 18. See ibid at 20-23 for his differentiation from Katz’s 
account. 
78
 Dorfman, “Private Ownership,” supra note 76 at 23. 
79
 Ibid at 27-34.  
80
 My point here is that Dorfman sees the special authority of owners as being rooted in the way in which they 
can alter others’ positions towards legal things, Dorfman “Private Ownership,” ibid at 16-23. 
81
 Ibid at 35. 
82





 Ibid at 981-85;  
85
 David Lametti, “The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth” (2003) 53 UTLJ 325 
[Lametti, “Concept of Property”]. 
86
 Avihay Dorfman, “Private Ownership and the Standing to Say So” (2014) 64:3 UTLJ 401 at 408, 422-38 
[Dorfman, “Standing to Say So”]. 
87
 Ibid at 425-38. 
88
 Ibid at 428-432. 
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another’s property will interfere with their ability “to set and pursue ends” is unnecessary.
89
 
While Dorfman does not comment on the neo-Kantian response to the inequalities of 
property, Dagan does and he insists that it is inadequate.
90
 Neo-Kantians argue for a robust 
welfare system to mitigate the inequalities of property but, as Dagan has pointed out, this 
creates the very dependency the neo-Kantians are trying to avoid.
91
 Given his account of 
property-as-respect, Dorfman has suggested that the solution to the inequalities for property 
would be for everyone to have some.
92
 
In summary, both Dorfman and Dagan understand property as primarily being about 
relationships and about promoting respect for individual autonomy. Both adopt some of the 
bêtes noires of the rights-based theorists, such as a commitment to Legal Realism and an 
understanding of property as being about social relationships rather than person-thing 
relationships. So too,  both reject attempts to offer a core list of rights which an individual 
must have to be considered an owner. With this in mind, I now turn to the argument advanced 
in “The Human Right to Private Property.” 
 
C. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
 
Dagan and Dorfman’s article, “The Human Right to Private Property,” has three goals of 
varying degrees of ambition. These are: first, to offer an account of private property which 
could be understood as a human right; second, to argue against what they refer to as the 
libertarian understanding of private property; and, third, to show that their understanding of 
private property could challenge the current global land rush.
93
 In this section, I set out their 
account and how they advance their argument. Where relevant, I refer back to their earlier 
work and to the other papers in their autonomy-based private law project. First, however, it is 
helpful to note a few aspects of their approach which are unclear.   
In common with many property theorists, it is not immediately obvious whether 
Dagan and Dorfman are writing about all kinds of property or just property-in-land. The 
boundary approach of many rights-based theorists suggests that the classic example of an 
“owned thing” is a piece of land or a freehold estate in land.
94
 Similarly, progressive theorists 
seem to focus the bulk of their attention on property-in-land as shown by their discussion of 
nuisance and what it reveals about property.
95
 That is not to say other legal things are ignored 
in property theory, rather that land is the archetypical legal thing for property theory. Given 
that Dagan and Dorfman are concerned (at least partially) with challenging the adverse 
impacts of the global land rush, it is fair to assume that their account of property is properly 
an account of property-in-land. 
                                                 
89
 Ibid at 427. But see Ripstein, “Possession and Use,” supra note 47 at 160 (“the nub of a property right is that 
the owner rather than others gets to determine how the thing will be used” [emphasis in original]). 
90
 Hanoch Dagan, “The Public Dimension of Private Property” (2013) 24 King’s LJ 260 at 269 [Dagan, “Public 
Dimension”]. 
91
 Ibid at 269. 
92
 Dorfman, “Normativity,” supra note 82 at 1007. In so doing he answers Jane Baron’s critique that relational 
accounts of property ignore questions of inequality; see Jane B Baron, “Property and “No Property”” (2005-
2006) 42 Houston L Rev 1425 at 1428. 
93
 What Dagan and Dorfman mean by the global land rush is large-scale, transnational transfers of, primarily 
agricultural, land without adequate protections for those who actually live and work on the land, Hanoch Dagan, 
“Property Theory, Essential Resources, and the Global Land Rush” in Olivier De Schutter & Katharina Pistor, 
eds, Governing Access to Essential Resources (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015) 81. See also, 
Olivier De Schutter, “The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users” (2010) 52 
Harv Int’l LJ 504 
94
 For an overview of this approach see Katz, “Exclusion,” supra note 40 at 276-82. 
95
 Alexander, “Social Obligation Norm,” supra note 52 at 780; Singer, “No Right to Exclude,” supra note 55 at 
1455-62. 
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Another common elision in property theory is defining property as individual 
ownership.
96
 Ownership may well be the most important aspect of property but many of the 
benefits of ownership can be guaranteed through secure tenancies and so on. It does not 
matter much from the perspective of trespass law whether the owner or her tenant is in 
possession at the time of the trespass; the law will prosecute the trespasser regardless. Such a 
situation is, in my view, compatible with Dorfman’s property-as-respect argument though it 
raises the question of whether property law really respects individuals or whether it respects 
things. At best, it can be said that the thing is a proxy for the individual. I return to this point 
later. In terms of whether Dagan and Dorfman’s account is about property writ large or 




The approach in “The Human Right to Private Property” is a marriage of Dagan and 
Dorfman’s earlier work. It adopts Dorfman’s property-as-respect argument, Dagan’s legal 
optimism, and their shared emphasis on property’s relational aspects. The thrust of their 
argument in this joint work is that by changing our definition of property, we can make 
private property compatible with our commitment to individual equality. They open with a 
reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ protection of private property and a 
comment that this right seems to be one “which focuses solely on people’s formal 
opportunity to become owners and conceptualizes violations only in terms of deprivation of 
pre-existing recognised rights to private property.”
98
 They call this account of private 
property rights “libertarian” and argue that it cannot account for property as a human right.
99
  
In order for private property to be a human right it must “be due to [its] significance 
for the maxim of treating every person as a human being whose dignity – or normative 
agency – fundamentally matters.”
100
 Dagan and Dorfman argue that the libertarian account of 
private property cannot do this because human dignity cannot be guaranteed by the formal 
independence or negative freedom arguments of libertarians. Here, they associate libertarian 
formal independence with the neo-Kantian approach and argue that it fails to protect the right 
to self-determination which is essential for any “fully human life.”
101
 It is not just that private 
property can be made compatible with the self-determination essential for such a life but that, 
properly understood, private property is essential to a fully human life. They argue that 
private property has a “unique contribution to our autonomy” due to “the requirements it 
places on others, in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions.”
102
  
The vertical dimension refers to the respect demanded from the state, while the 
horizontal refers to respect demanded from others.
103
 The fact that owners are in a position of 
authority over others is one reason why private property raises questions of legitimacy given 
that not everyone is an owner. Dagan and Dorfman face this question of legitimacy head on.  
In contrast to libertarians who argue that it falls to the state to address the inequalities 
produced by ownership, a stance which avoids redistribution and thus protects private 
                                                 
96
 Singer, “No Right to Exclude,” supra note 55 at 1453; Sarah E Hamill, “Private Rights to Public Property: 
The Evolution of Common Property in Canada” (2012) 58:2 McGill LJ 365 at 370-80.  
97
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Human Right,” supra note 7 at 410-11. The text itself is: “(1) Everyone has the right to 
own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property,” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, GA Res 217 A (III), art 17. 
98
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Human Right,” supra note 7 at 393. 
99
 Ibid at 393. 
100
 Ibid at 396. 
101
 Ibid at 396. Due to constraints of space I leave aside the potential critique that this conception of humanity 
has no room for those incapable of self-determination such as those with serious mental disabilities. 
102
 Dagan & Dorfman, “Human Right,” supra note 7 at 397. 
103
 Ibid at 397-98. 
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 Dagan and Dorfman argue that “the authority of owners is founded on a 
requirement of reciprocal respect and recognition among self-determining persons.”
105
 Such 




Given their account’s emphasis on the relational aspects of property, Dagan and 
Dorfman adopt an unusual position with respect to the relationship between property rights 
and the state. Some rights-based theorists argue that private property can be considered pre-
political in that it pre-dates the state.
107
 Others, such as the neo-Kantians, argue that private 
property can only be fully justified in a particular kind of state.
108
 For Dagan and Dorfman 
property is an inescapably political way of being, but one which is not necessarily statist.
109
 
In other words, we can think about property without reference to a state because it is about 
“our interactions with other persons in their capacity as private individuals, and not as co-
citizens.”
110
 As the other papers in this series makes clear, they understand the whole of 
private law to be inherently political but not inherently statist.
111
 It is not clear whether Dagan 
and Dorfman mean the formal state apparatus or any kind of organized social grouping with 
territorial control when they talk about “the state.” Most rights-based theorists seem to mean 
the latter when they talk about property being pre-political. Dagan and Dorfman, however, 
seem to understand any human relationship as political.
112
 Their concern appears to be with 
how individuals interact with other individuals qua individuals and so it seems that they too 
mean any organized social grouping with territorial control when they talk about “the state.” 
Dagan and Dorfman see their account of property law and private law more broadly 
as being universal but not universalizing. That is, they are not calling for the “universal 
harmonization of private law,”
113
 but attempting to identify the motivating idea at the heart of 
any system of private law. In earlier work, Dagan eschewed doctrine, or at least downplayed 
its role.
114
 The role of doctrine in autonomy-based private law is somewhat ambiguous. At 
times, they seem to caution against case-by-case decision-making yet at other times, 
particularly in the context of combatting the global land rush, they suggest that formal rules 
of title should be dispensed with where it is clear that blind adherence will work an 
injustice.
115
 Their method is similar to Ripstein’s neo-Kantian approach, in that they, like 
Ripstein, take a particular moral idea and see how private law fits with it.
116
 Where they 
differ is that Ripstein uses the idea that no person should be in charge of another as his 
starting point.
117
 Then again, Dorfman’s earlier work on trespass works backwards from the 
strictness of trespass doctrine to argue that only property-as-respect fully explains why 
trespass takes the shape that it does, suggesting an approach more in keeping with how 
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Weinrib examines private law.
118
 Weinrib starts from how private law is structured and works 
backwards to argue that Kantian ideas form the normative underpinning of private law. 
It is possible for the moral idea at the core of Dagan and Dorfman’s account of private 
law to be both internal to private law as it currently is and capable of offering normative 
guidance. The demand to be recognized by others as “substantively free and equal agents” 
can fit with a wide variety of alternative private law rules. As I understand it, Dagan and 
Dorfman’s project is primarily, though not exclusively, transnational in that they see their 
core idea as most useful in settling disputes in international private law.
119
 However, their 
account of property law does contain particular implications which flow from the special 
authority owners have. 
One of the implications of Dagan and Dorfman’s account of property has already 
been noted: that everyone must have private property in order for it to be the  human right it 
is often claimed to be.
120
 The other key implications of their account of property are of a 
transnational scale. It is here that the significance of their non-statist account of private 
property becomes clear. They argue that their understanding of private property could 
challenge the global land rush by emphasizing that the buyer who buys land from which 
those without formal property rights will be displaced commits “an international private 
wrong” by failing to respect the claims of the displaced persons.
121
 As such property-as-
respect can challenge the deference of “traditional international private law … to domestic 
property rules” 
122
 Dagan and Dorfman recognize that, in the context of the global land rush, 
many of the displaced lack formal property rights but they argue that the displaced can rely 
on property’s foundational values of “self-determination and relational equality” to imbue 
their informal claims with the full force of private property rights.
123
 The point being that we 
as individuals should pay less attention to the rules of formal title and more attention to the 
actual occupants of the land. In this way, private law will rescue us from the failures of 
international human rights law. As Dagan and Dorfman put it, “only private law can form and 
sustain the variety of frameworks necessary for our ability to lead our conception of the good 
life; and only private law can cast them as interactions between free and equal individuals 
who respect one another as the persons they actually are, thus vindicating the demands of 
relational justice.”
124
 Thus not only can we dispense with doctrine (to some extent, under 
some circumstances) but we can also, potentially, dispense with the state and rely on private 




II. SOME ISSUES WITH DAGAN AND DORFMAN’S 
ARGUMENT 
 
Dagan and Dorfman’s main goal is to offer an account of private property which can make 
property rights human rights. In this section I highlight some issues with their account. To 
some extent the implications flowing from their account are utopian, particularly the 
argument that everyone should become an owner. That aspects of their account are utopian is 
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not fatal to their account as a whole, what is more challenging is the lingering question of 
private property’s equality. As I argue in this section, it is doubtful whether the authority 
problem of private property can simply be solved by giving everyone some property or by 
turning everyone into an owner. First, however, I return to the proxy problem. 
Dagan and Dorfman limit the respect inherent in their understanding of private 
property to “natural persons.”
126
 The question of how their account would matter for legal 
persons is left to one side.
127
 Given that it builds on Dorfman’s earlier account of private 
property which does not limit itself, at least not explicitly, to natural persons there is no prima 
facie reason why it could not also apply to legal persons. Even if it did not, how can anyone 
be sure of what property is owned by a natural person and what is owned by a legal person?   
To the extent that Dorfman’s account of the strictness of trespass fits with the idea of 
not substituting our wishes for those of the owner, the thing is the proxy for the owner. We 
respect the owner by respecting the boundaries of the legal thing. For example, the house at 
the corner of my street might well have been abandoned and have no owner but the vast 
majority of people walking past are not likely to feel they can cut across the garden or 
through the house. As Lametti points out, in Anglo-common law countries or, indeed, most 
western countries, we assume that houses have owners and modify our behaviour 
accordingly.
128
 So the question becomes, are we respecting the owner by not trespassing or 
are we respecting the thing? According to the property-as-respect view, it is both but, in 
practice, we assume certain things are owned and we behave towards them in the same way 




Here the proxy problem raises the long-standing debate in property theory about the 
Hohfeldian approach to rights, particularly his argument that all legal relations are between 
two people. In an earlier article, Dorfman offered a lengthy defence of Hohfeldian rights 
against Penner’s critique.
130
 The debate centres on distinguishing in personam rights, that is 
those rights good against a specific individual, from in rem rights, which are those good 
against the world. In particular, the disagreement is whether or not the latter are relational 
and, even more exactly, whether impersonal norms can be relational. Both Penner and 
Dorfman use trespass to illustrate their argument. Penner’s objection to the Hohfeldian 
account stems from his understanding that, for Hohfeld’s theory of relational rights to be true, 
when the owner of Blackacre changes “everyone else in the world exchanges one duty for 
another.”
131
 Under this interpretation, we would always need to know who the owner is in 
order to properly execute our duty not to trespass. Yet, as Penner puts it, “the duty not to 
interfere with the property of owners is not owner-specific.”
132
 Accordingly, rights in rem are 
rights to things rather than taking the relational structure of rights and duties between 
individuals envisioned by Hohfeld. Penner further supports this with the idea that trespass is 
owned to possessors rather than owners.
133
 Suggesting, once again, that it does not matter 
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who is in possession—the owner, her tenant, her tenant’s house-sitting friend—the duty not 
to trespass remains the same. 
Dorfman objects to Penner’s account because the relational aspect of trespass is a 
duty to acknowledge that “for any given object which can reasonably be identified as being 
owner by another, there is someone … who can fix the normative standing of others in 
relation to that object.”
134
 His point is that if we understand the duty against trespass as 
respecting the “practice of property,” as Penner does, we will turn owners into “mere 
patients” rather than agents.
135
 In order for trespass to be a truly private law doctrine, 
according to Dorfman, it must not rely on general practices but on the respect owned to each 
individual as an individual. Insofar as Dorfman rescues the Hohfeldian account against 
Penner’s critique, he only manages to show that Hohfeldian rights and duties can be 
impersonal and we do not actually need to know who the owner is, just that there is an owner, 
or could be an owner.
136
 
As compelling as Dorfman’s reconstruction of the Hohfeldian account is, it does not 
escape the necessity of some understanding of the practice of property to order to make 
trespass intelligible. As I understand it, Dorfman’s version of Hohfeldian rights requires the 
relational aspects of in rem rights to arise as a result of each person being recognized as 
substantively free and equal and this respect for individuals qua individuals is all we need to 
understand our duty against trespass. Except that understanding everyone as free and equal 
tells us nothing about where we can be and what we can use. Without knowing which objects 
might be owned, we cannot be sure of when we will have the duty to avoid trespassing.    
To give an example, Scotland, famously, has an extensive right to roam which is part 
of an ancient tradition.
137
 While the right to roam also exists in England, it is much less 
extensive and covers much less land and fewer rivers.
138
 A Scottish person unaware of the 
more restricted rights in England might inadvertently commit trespass when travelling 
through England. The inadvertent trespass here is unlikely to be prosecuted,
139
 nonetheless it 
illustrates how important it is that we know what things are owned and whether we actually 
have a duty not to trespass. Scottish landowners are clearly still owners in the Dorfmanian 
sense, they can still alter another person’s standing by selling their property,
140
 it is just that 
the content of ownership is different than in other countries; the practice of property is 
different in Scotland. 
One response to the inability of property-as-respect to tell us when the duty against 
trespass might be owed is that the whole point is to leave scope for different property 
regimes. To phrase it differently, Dagan and Dorfman’s goal is to find a core idea which 
holds good across all private property systems. Yet, both acknowledge that “[p]rivate 
ownership … constitutes a common framework of property coordination structured around 
the owner’s demand for recognition from other persons.”
141
 The concept of a framework 
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suggests something more than just individuals relating to individuals as individuals, it 
suggests individuals relating to each other as part of a community with a shared 
understanding of what private property means. What neither accounts for is that an individual 
will also have a relationship with this framework, in addition to the interpersonal 
relationships which constitute it. To put it another way, we have relationships with the 
various communities to which we belong, just as much as we have relationships with the 
individual members who constitute those communities. 
 The “common framework of coordination” refers back to Dorfman’s earlier work and 
his differentiation of contract from property.
142
 The key difference Dorfman identifies is that 
contract’s coordinating framework is selective while property’s is not.
143
 Property’s social 
coordination is not a daisy-chain of individual agreements but a “common endeavour” of 
“coordinati[ng] competing claims of distinct persons over an object.”
144
 The benefit of this 
common framework is that everyone with a claim is treated as an agent rather than being 
represented by someone else as would be the case in a series of contracts.
145
 
The common framework seems to arise as a result of “the respect and recognition 
established by property”
 146
 but it is not clear why this framework and the respect it demands 
are unconditional. Following the logic of Dorfman’s argument it seems as though property 
simply has to exist in order for individuals to be respected as agents. For example: 
[T]hese acts [larceny and deliberate trespass] of violating the property right of 
another are inconsistent with a commitment on the part of society to coordinate 
activities in a distinctively respectful manner which is unconditionally binding 
upon all persons by virtue of being persons.
147
 
Such an understanding raises a variation on the proxy problem because a person who does 
not own anything seems to lack the respect and recognition they are owed by virtue of being 
a person.
148
 Dorfman has suggested that everyone will need to be an owner in order to make 
property fully legitimate, an argument which is also referenced in “The Human Right to 
Private Property.”
149
 However, even if everyone was a private owner, this still would not 
provide a full answer to the question of why it is that an owner’s authority is legitimate and 
binding on everyone, even those the owner will never meet.
150
   
Granting private ownership to all would, admittedly, solve some of the legitimacy 
problems presented by private property. If everyone is a private owner, the human rights 
protections for private property do make more sense as human rights. Yet the legitimacy of 
the owner’s authority remains doubtful. As I understand it Dagan and Dorfman’s property-as-
respect suggests that by granting everyone ownership, everyone will get the respect and 
recognition they are owed as persons. In addition, because of the special authority owners 
have—that of having the power to change the normative standing of others with respect to 
what they own—making everyone an owner goes some way to resolving the unequal 
authority ownership creates. Yet the inequality in owner/non-owner interactions remains even 
if the non-owner is an owner in other interactions. 
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To give an example, if I own a mall I may, if I so choose, ban protesters from my 
property. It does not matter if the protesters in question own land elsewhere, they may not 
access mine without my permission. One potential response to this critique is that protesters 
who ignore my wishes here are not recognizing me as an agent. Another potential response is 
that, as an owner, my rights will not be absolute and I may have to make some interpersonal 
accommodation for the protesters. In practice, however, when these kinds of situations arise, 
the mall owner wins unless there is a legislative exemption for certain kinds of protester, such 
as workers on a lawful strike.
151
 My point is that the fact of ownership, by itself, can offer no 
solution in these sorts of situations, it requires some background framework which is more 
than the coordinating framework suggested by Dorfman and Dagan. 
Dagan and Dorfman’s response to this point might be that I have misunderstood their 
argument and that private law can and should accommodate demands like those of protesters 
on mall property. The specific example they use to illustrate the importance of relational 
justice as well as collective justice is that of fair housing. The rules about fair housing might 
be considered by many to properly belong to public law or, at least, are public-law limitations 
on private law doctrines. However, for Dagan and Dorfman fair housing provisions are 
inherently part of an autonomy-based private law given how such rules avoid “social 
relationships that proceed in defiance of the equal standing and autonomy of the person 
subjected to discrimination.”
152
  Their point is that by discriminating in housing provision, 
landlords fail to “respect the individual on her own terms.”
153
 In short, theirs is a private law 
which naturalizes human rights. 
As laudable as this attempt to make human rights central to private law is, it 
downplays the fact that fair housing provisions took years of work by campaigners and the 
enactment of anti-discrimination  legislation to make them effective.
154
 Historically, private 
law doctrine has tended to allow the discrimination which fair housing rules prohibit. Courts 
invoked freedom of contract and freedom of commerce to uphold discriminatory treatment. It 
is only with the dawn of human rights legislation and their acceptance and recognition by 




Dagan and Dorfman’s concern with finding a way internal to property law to address 
the injustices of the global land rush illustrates the continued resistance to human rights-
based claims. Theoretically those without formal title, including those at risk of displacement 
under the “global land rush,” already have human rights. Moreover, they should also have the 
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right to housing and an adequate standard of living as guaranteed under article 11 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
156
 These rights have proven 
difficult to realize even in advanced countries less at risk from the land rush.
157
 Thus while 
such socio-economic rights might seem to offer a way around the lack of formal title, in 
reality they do not and formal title continues to be championed by a range of international 
institutions.
158
 This is a point Dagan and Dorfman  acknowledge by arguing that our attention 
to the relational aspects of property law should grant private property rights to those on the 
land but without formal title. In other words, we should recognize others as having private 
property rights because they are human and because we respect them as such. 
Coupled with the abandonment of questions of formal title and thus much of property 
doctrine, Dagan and Dorfman’s proposed response to the global land rush runs the risk of 
being arbitrary. As laudable as their attempts to limit displacement of those without formal 
title may be, their solution effectively turns private law into a matter of individual conscience. 
Absent in their account is any discussion of how such violations of “foundational property 
values” are to be enforced. While private law, including private property, can be understood 
in a way which fits with the claim that it is about individuals relating to individuals as equals, 
that understanding is based on trust. As Dan Priel observes, “peaceful mechanisms that allow 
neighbours to settle their disputes without law, are easier to sustain when a state with well-
functioning institutions exists in the background.”
159
 The point being it is much easier to treat 
someone else as an equal if you know that their failure to do the same to you will be 
punished.   
Pointing out that peaceful dispute mechanisms work best when there is a well-
functioning state is perhaps unfair given that it is a factual answer to a conceptual argument.  
A more serious critique is Priel’s point about the impossibility of interpersonal relations with 
everyone.
160
 Priel’s critique is aimed at Allen Beever,
161
 a neo-Kantian scholar, rather than 
Dagan and Dorfman’s account of property, but it holds for their description of property as 
well. Priel’s point is that “because property rights impose limits on all others, they cannot be 
grounded only in interpersonal relations” and hence require a state to create the kind of rights 
that can bind everyone.
162
   
Beever’s account of property law and private law is part of the same “libertarian 
account” which Dagan and Dorfman critique. Dagan and Dorfman distinguish their account 
from the libertarian one on the grounds that by relying on the welfare state to justify private 
ownership they cannot recognise the substantive equality of each individual, merely their 
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 This distinction does not answer Priel’s question about how private 
property can possibly bind everyone as nobody has “interpersonal relations with all other 
humans.”
164
 Here Dorfman’s earlier attempt to revive the Hohfeldian account of in rem rights 
could offer one answer in that in rem rights are impersonal and general, yet again, such an 
account tells us nothing about how we can fulfil that duty without also knowing the thing(s) 
through which that duty will be mediated. It also does not fully explain why such rights 
would bind everyone. 
Here the problem is Dagan and Dorfman’s insistence on separating the horizontal and 
vertical aspects of property law. Their reference to Dorfman’s argument about the common 
framework private property creates, undermines the horizontal relationships they are 
attempting to describe. A common framework cannot operate solely at a horizontal level, it 
necessarily speaks to some kind of vertical relationship with an authority akin to that of a 
state. Condominiums offer an example of how our horizontal property-law relationships 
result in vertical relationships with non-state entities. All those who own or rent in a 
condominium are normally answerable to the condo board which sets specific rules and 
regulations for the condominium.   
My point is that private property rights arise as the result of a collective effort and in 
particular social contexts. It is not the result of individuals recognizing each other as having 
inherent worth. Even as Dagan and Dorfman insist on recognizing a thicker conception of the 
individual and that property is inherently social, they fail to recognize that property law (and 
perhaps private law more broadly) is about community as well as individuals. The closest 
they come to recognizing this is their brief reference to how property creates a common 
framework. It may be that in some property systems this framework helps to create, rather 
than being constituted by, the freedom and equality of each individual.
165
 For example, Joel 
Ngugi’s work highlights the deeper social aspect of property rights, he takes seriously the 
role that society has to play in creating property.
166
 If property is inherently social the 
meaning of social cannot be exhausted by individual-individual relationships but must also 
include the influences (both positive and negative) of community and the shared 




Dagan and Dorfman’s autonomy-based account of private law is an ambitious project and it 
is one which I find both sympathetic and attractive. However, as I have attempted to show in 
this paper, their argument, particularly as it applies to private property, has several 
weaknesses.  First, while it is true that many property doctrines can be explained by the idea 
of property-as-respect, the idea of respecting an individual by respecting their property also 
requires us to know what their property actually is. The what of property law cannot be 
explained simply by reference to individual equality and autonomy. It has to be explained 
with reference to the shared understandings of each system of property, which in turn 
suggests the intertwined nature of property’s vertical and horizontal relationships. 
 Second, making everyone an owner does not provide a full answer to the question of 
private property’s legitimacy. It does grant everyone the unique power of ownership, but the 
unique power of ownership only relates to the property an individual owns does not matter 
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when a person is away from that property. Accordingly, the imbalance of power between 
non-owners and owners remains.   
 The third problem with Dagan and Dorfman’s account is the proxy problem. I may 
agree that their account of property is more plausible as a human right than other accounts but 
it runs the risk of only recognizing people as having human rights if they have property 
instead of recognizing people as having private property because they are human. It also 
raises the question of whether property law really respects individuals or whether it respects 
the things—whatever they may be—which individuals own or could own. 
 Dagan and Dorfman’s autonomy-based private law can be understood as an attempt to 
make human rights, or the ideal they argue is at the core of human rights—individual equality 
and freedom—inherent in private law. As laudable as this goal is, history has shown us again 
and again that this is not true. Private law does not automatically recognise everyone as of 
equal worth and it has taken decades of activism to ensure that we could be in a position 
where Dagan and Dorfman’s argument might be compelling. Such activism should not be 
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